We propose a combination of model checking and interactive theorem proving where the theorem prover is used to represent nite and in nite state systems, reason about them compositionally and reduce them to small nite systems by v eri ed abstractions. As an example we v erify a version of the Alternating Bit Protocol with unbounded lossy and duplicating channels: the channels are abstracted by i n teractive proof and the resulting nite state system is model checked.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to combine the two major paradigms for the veri cation of distributed systems: model checking and theorem proving. The advantages of each approach a r e well known: model checking is automatic but limited to nite state processes, theorem proving requires user interaction but can deal with arbitrary processes. Recently attempts have been made to combine the strength of both methods by using the deductive m a c hinery of theorem provers to reduce \large" correctness problems to ones which are small enough for model checking. The key idea is abstraction whereby the state space is partitioned to obtain a smaller automaton which is amenable to model checking. Of course the abstraction has to be sound w.r.t. the property w e w ant t o c heck: if the abstracted automaton satis es the property s o should the original automaton.
In our approach the theorem prover provides a common representation language and tools for both nite and in nite state systems, checking the soundness of abstractions, reasoning about systems in a compositional manner. Our work is based on Lynch and Tuttle's Input/Output-Automata (IOA) 1 4 ] as model of distributed processes which h a ve b e e n e m bedded in the theorem prover Isabelle/ HOL 15] . We are interested in verifying safety properties of IOA. These safety properties are not expressed by temporal logic formulae but again by I O A. Hence we n e e d t o c heck that the traces of one IOA C (the implementation) are included in the traces of another IOA A (the speci cation). Assuming that C is in nite or at least too large to check traces(C ) traces(A) automatically, w e de ne an intermediate automaton B which is an abstraction of C and should satisfy traces(C ) traces(B) traces(A). Thus we h a ve a c hieved the following division of labor: traces(C ) traces(B), i.e. the soundness of the abstraction, is proved interactively in Isabelle traces (B) Research supported by ESPRIT BRA 6453, Types. The main distinguishing feature of our approach is the ability to reason about the soundness of arbitrary abstractions because we h a ve the meta-theory of IOA at our disposal. Assuming that the theorem prover and the formalization of IOA in it are correct, the only remaining source of errors is the model checker which is treated like an oracle by the theorem prover. Note that this includes the interface between model checker and theorem prover, which is particularly critical because we need to ensure that the theorem prover formalizes exactly the logic the model checker is based on.
The rest of the paper illustrates this approach using a particular example, namely an implementation of the Alternating Bit Protocol using unbounded channels. This is in contrast to pure model checking approaches where the channels are always of a xed capacity (usually 1). The key to the success of our approach is the fact that channels may lose and duplicate, but not reorder messages. Thus is is possible to compactify channels without altering their behaviour by collapsing all adjacent identical messages. This is what our abstraction from C to B does. The full picture looks like this: The implementation C contains unbounded channels Ch which are abstracted/compacti ed by a function reduce. I t i s s h o wn interactively that reduce is indeed an abstraction function, i.e. traces(Ch) traces(RedCh). B is the same as C except that collapsing channels are used. Compositionality p r o ves that C must be an implementation of B, i . e . traces(C ) traces(B). Although RedCh is not a nite state system, it behaves like one if used in the context of the ABP because at any one time there are at most two di erent messages on each c hannel. Thus B is a nite state system. Note however, that we n e v er need to prove this explicitly. This is merely an intuition which is later con rmed by the model checker which i s g i v en a description of B and A together with an abstraction function abs between them. The model checker explores the full state space of B verifying transition by transition that abs is indeed an abstraction. It is only the successful termination of the model checker which tells us that B must be nite.
Related work
Our paper is closely related to the work by Hungar 11] who embeds a subset of OCCAM in the theorem prover LAMBDA and combines it with an external model checker. The key di erence is that Hungar relies much more on unformalized meta-theory than we do: he axiomatizes OCCAM's proof rules instead of deriving them from a semantics, and does not verify the soundness of his data abstractions.
The literature on abstraction for model checking is already quite extensive (see, for example, 4, 8, 5] ). The general idea is to compute an abstract program given a concrete one together with an abstraction function/relation. The approach o f C l a r k e et al. is in principle also applicable to in nite concrete systems. However, since they compute an approximation to the real abstract program, the result is not necessarily nite state. Nevertheless it would be interesting to rephrase their ideas in terms of IOA and apply them to our example. In this case we w ould not give B explicitly but would compute (via the rewriting machinery of the theorem prover) a (hopefully nite state) approximation of it.
Our work di ers from most approaches to model checking because we d o n o t c heck i f a n automaton satis es a temporal logic formula but if its traces are included in those of another automaton. Although theoretically equivalent, automata can be compared by p r o viding an explicit abstraction function (or simulation relation), abs above. The same approach is followed in 12] where abstraction functions are also used for reduction, and in 9] where liveness is taken into account. If the documentation aspect of an explicit abstraction function is not considered important, one could also use a model checker which searches for an abstraction function using, for example, the techniques of 6], although this is bound to be less e cient.
Finally there is the result by Abdulla and Jonsson 1] that certain properties of nite state systems communicating via unbounded lossy channels are decidable, which they apply to the Alternating Bit Protocol. However, in our work the channels can both lose and duplicate messages. Hence their result does not apply directly.
2 I/O-Automata in Isabelle/HOL Isabelle notation. Set comprehension has the shape fe: Pg, where e is an expression and P a predicate. Tuples are written between angle brackets, e.g. <s a t>, and are nested pairs with projection functions fst and snd. I f f is a function of type 1 ! 2 ! 3 , application is written f (x y) rather than f x y . Conditional expressions are written if (A B C ). The empty list is written ], and \cons" is written in x: h :: tl. F unction composition is another in x, e.g. f g.
I/O Automata
An IOA is a nite or in nite state automaton with labelled transitions. I/O automata, initially introduced by L y n c h and Tuttle 14], are still under development, and the formalization we used represents only a fragment of the theory one can nd in recent papers 7] . For example, we do not take care of fairness or time constraints. The details of the formalization can be found in a previous paper 15], so that we g i v e only a brief sketch of the essential de nitions inside Isabelle/HOL. An action signature is described by the type ( )signature ( )set ( )set ( )set:
The rst, second and third components of an action signature S may be extracted with inputs, outputs, a n d internals. F urthermore, actions(S) = inputs(S) outputs(S) internals(S), and externals(S) = inputs(S) outputs(S). Action signatures have to satisfy the following condition:
is asig(triple) (inputs(triple) \ outputs(triple) = fg)( outputs(triple) \ internals(triple) = fg)( inputs(triple) \ internals(triple) = fg)
An IOA is a triple with type de ned by
and it is further required that the rst member of the triple be an action signature, the second be a non-empty set of start states and the third be an input-enabled state transition relation:
IOA(<asig starts trans>) is asig(asig)^starts 6 = fg^is state trans(asig trans):
The property of being an input-enabled state transition relation is de ned as follows: is state trans(asig R) (8<s a t> 2 R: a 2 actions(asig))( 8a 2 inputs(asig):8s:9t: < s a t> 2 R) The projections from an IOA a r e asig of , starts of , and trans of . The actions of an IOA a r e de ned acts actions asig of .
An execution-fragment of an IOA A is a nite or in nite sequence that consists of alternating states and actions. In Isabelle it is represented as a pair of sequences: an in nite state sequence of type nat ! state and an action sequence of type nat ! (action)option. Here the option datatype is de ned as ( )option = None j Some( ) using an ML-like notation. A nite sequence in this representation ends with an in nite number of consecutive Nones. Using this representation, a step of an execution-fragment <as ss> is <ss (i) a ss(i + 1 ) > if as(i) = Some(a). Formally:
is execution fragment(A < as ss>) 8n a : (as(n) = None ss(Suc(n)) = ss(n))( as(n) = Some(a) <ss (n) a ss(Suc(n))> 2 trans of (A)) An execution of A is an execution-fragment o f A that begins in a start state of A. I f w e lter the action sequence of an execution of A so that it has only external actions, we obtain a trace of A. The traces of A are de ned by traces(A) f lter( a:a 2 externals(asig of (A)) as) : 9ss: < as ss> 2 executions(A)g where lter replaces Some(a) b y None if a is not an external action.
Composition and Re nement
I/O automata provide a notion of parallel composition. In Isabelle this mechanism is realized by a binary operator k. The de nition simply re ects the fact that each component performs its locally de ned transitions if the relevant action is part of its actions signature, otherwise it remains unchanged.
A k B <asig comp(asig of (A) asig of (B)) f<u v> : u 2 starts of (A)^v 2 starts of (B)g f<s act t> : (act 2 acts(A) _ act 2 acts(B))î f (act 2 acts(A) < fst(s) act fst(t)> 2 trans of (A) fst(s) = fst(t))î f (act 2 acts(B) < snd(s) act snd(t)> 2 trans of (B) snd(s) = snd(t))g> where an action signature composition is needed: asig comp(S 1 S 2 ) <(inputs (S 1 ) inputs(S 2 )) ; (outputs(S 1 ) outputs(S 2 )) outputs(S 1 ) outputs(S 2 ) internals(S 1 ) internals(S 2 )> Action signature composition presumes compatibility of actions, which is de ned by compatible(S 1 S 2 ) (outputs(S 1 ) \ outputs(S 2 ) = fg)( outputs(S 1 ) \ internals(S 2 ) = fg)( outputs(S 2 ) \ internals(S 1 ) = fg) and is trivially extended to compatibility of automata. For the aim of re nement, we m a k e use of abstraction functions which L y n c h and Tuttle call \weak possibility mappings". The set of these maps is described by the following predicate, which takes a function f (from concrete states to abstract states), a concrete automaton C , and an abstract automaton A.
is weak pmap(f C A) (8s 0 2 starts of (C ): f (s 0 ) 2 starts of (A))( 8s t a : reachable(C s)^<s a t> 2 trans of (C ) if (a 2 externals(asig of (C )) < f (s) a f (t)> 2 trans of (A) f (s) = f (t))) The following theorem proved in Isabelle states that the existence of an abstraction function from C to A implies that the traces of C are contained in those of A.
IOA(C )^IOA(A)ê xternals(asig of (C )) = externals(asig of (A))î s weak pmap(f C A) traces(C ) traces(A) The Alternating Bit Protocol 3] is designed to ensure that messages are delivered in order, from a sender to a receiver, in the presence of channels that can lose and duplicate messages. This FIFO-communication can be speci ed by a simple queue and therefore a single automaton Spec. A s w e are aiming for a nite state system, we h a ve to consider an additional point: The sender bu er of the implementation will not be able to store an unbounded number of incoming messages. Restricting the number of input actions to yield a nite sender bu er is not allowed because of the input-enabledness required of IOA. What we really need is an assumption about the behav i o u r o f t h e e n vironment, namely that it will only send the next message if requested to do so by an explicit action Next issued by the system. In the IOA-model this can be expressed by including an environment I O A which embodies this assumption. Therefore the speci cation is a parallel composition of two processes:
Speci cation Env k Spec and the interaction between them is shown in Fig. 1 
The Speci cation
The state of the IOA Spec is a message queue q, initially empty, modelled with the type ( )list, where the parameter represents the message type. The only actions performed in the abstract system are: S msg(m), putting message m at the end of q, R msg(m), taking message m from the head of q, a n d Next, signaling the world outside to send the next message. Formally: The Implementation a sender, a receiver, and proprietary channels for both. The \data ow" in the system is depicted in Fig. 2 Messages are transmitted from the sender to the receiver with a single header bit as packets of type bool . The type of system actions, ( )action, is described in Isabelle by the following ML-style datatype:
( )action Next j S msg( ) j R msg( ) j S pkt(bool ) j R pkt(bool ) j S ack(bool) j R ack(bool) 
The Sender

The Receiver
The state of the process Receiver is also a pair di ering from the Sender simply in the initial value of the header variable: output pre: b = header Note that R pkt does not change the state unless message = None. This ensures that the receiver has passed the last message on via R msg before accepting a new one. Alternatively, one could add the precondition message = None to S ack which w ould preclude the sender getting an acknowledgment and sending a new message before the receiver has actually passed the old one on.
The Channels
The channels, R Ch and S Ch, h a ve v ery similar functionality. Roughly speaking, messages are added to a queue by an input action and removed from it by the corresponding output action. In addition, there can be no change at all in order to model the possibility to lose messages in case of the adding action and to duplicate messages in case of the removing action. The only di erences between the channels are the type of the messages delivered, packets for S Ch and booleans for R Ch, and the speci c names for input and output actions, S pkt and R pkt or S ack and R ack, respectively. Therefore both channels can be designed as instances of a generic channel using the renaming function described in section 2. This is done by i n troducing a new datatype ( )act The concrete channels are obtained from the abstract channel by rename(Ch S acts) a n d rename(Ch R acts), where S acts : ( )action ! (bool ) act option R acts : (bool)action ! (bool) act option map the concrete actions to the corresponding abstract actions. For example S acts is de ned by S acts(S pkt(b m)) = Some(S(<b m>)), S acts(R pkt(b m)) = Some(R(<b m>)) and S acts(act) = None for all other actions act.
Abstraction
What we are aiming for is a nite-state description of the Alternating Bit Protocol that is re ned by the given implementation described in the previous section. On the way there we have to remove t wo obstacles: 1. The channel queues have to be nite. 2. The message alphabet has to be nite.
Finite Channels
Our attention is focused on this requirement. We de ned an abstract version RedCh of Ch and an abstraction function reduce from Ch to RedCh and prove is weak pmap(reduce Ch RedCh). The idea is based on the observation that at most two di erent messages are held in each c hannel. This is easily explained: each message is repeatedly sent t o S Ch, u n til the corresponding acknowledgment arrives. Once we switch to the next message, S Ch can only contain copies of the previous message. Hence, S Ch's queue is always of the form old new . The same is true for R Ch. T h us, if all adjacent identical messages are merged, the channels have size at most 2. Fortunately, this reasoning never needs to be formalized but is implicitly performed by the model checker.
5.1.1 Re nement o f C h a n n e l s The proof of this obligation is rather straightforward. It proceeds by case analysis on the type of actions. Using some lemmata on how reduce behaves when combined with operators like @ o r tl, most cases are automatically solved by the conditional and contextual rewriting of Isabelle. Finally, using the meta-theorem is weak pmap(abs C A) is weak pmap(abs rename(C f) rename(A f ))
we get the appropriate re nement results for the concrete channels S Ch, R Ch and their collapsed versions S RedCh and R RedCh.
Compositionality
In order to extend this re nement result from the channels to the whole system, we h a ve t o prove some compositionality results for re nements. Lynch and Tuttle 13] established the required lemma on the level of trace inclusions. We decided, however, to prove it on the level of abstraction functions for reasons of simplicity.
IOA(C 1 )^IOA(C 2 )^IOA(A 1 )^IOA(A 2 )ê xternals(asig of (C 1 )) = externals(asig of (A 1 ))ê xternals(asig of (C 2 )) = externals(asig of (A 2 ))ĉ 
Unfortunately, trace inclusion does not imply the existence of an abstraction function. Hence the above theorem is not as general as the corresponding one about traces, in particular since is weak pmap(id A A) only holds if A has no internal actions. We i n tend to formalize and prove compositionality on the trace level in the near future. Performing the proofs of abstraction and compositionality with Isabelle we encountered a mismatch b e t ween the time required for the re nement proof and that required for the compatibility c hecks. Nearly half the time (1.5 min on a SPARC station 10) was needed to establish that no component causes a name clash of input/output actions. These checks, although automated, are expensive if performed by a theorem prover. Partly this is caused by our decision to have rename translate action names in the opposite direction one would expect (see section 2.3), something we m a y need to rethink.
Finite Number of Messages
The second requirement, the problem of abstracting out data from a data-independent program has already been addressed by W olper 17]. In his paper he shows how to reduce an in nite data domain to a small nite one if data independence is guaranteed and the properties to be checked are expressible in propositional temporal logic. In 2] and 16] this method is applied to the Alternating Bit Protocol. There, only three di erent message values are needed to verify the protocol's functional correctness.
Basically, a program is data-independent if its behaviour does not depend on the speci c data it operates upon. A su cient condition for a program described by a n I O A to be data independent is that everywhere in the automaton the transitions are independent of the value of messages being transmitted. An inspection of our description of the protocol shows that it satis es the condition.
In contrast to 2] our speci cation is not given as a collection of temporal formulae, but in terms of I/O automata. Thus, the methods above are not directly applicable to our formalization and until now, we did not investigate how to transfer them formally into our setting. However, it is intuitively plausible that Wolper's theory of data-independence holds generally, independently of the respective formalization. That is why w e analogously restricted our model checking algorithm to deal with only three di erent message values.
A formal treatment of data-abstraction in Isabelle/HOL needs a modi cation of the way w e model data. Currently the diversity o f d a t a i s m o d e l l e d b y polymorphic types 1 . But since types are a meta-level notion and cannot be talked about (e.g. quanti ed) in HOL, even formalizing data independence seems to be impossible. Using object-level sets instead of polymorphism would cure this problem but is likely to complicate the theory.
Model Checking
The task of the model checker is to verify that B, the implementation with collapsing channels re nes A, the speci cation. The abstraction function abs is given by abs(s) l(R:message)@if (R:header = S:header l(S:message) tl(l(S:message))) where l : ( )option ! ( )list is de ned by the equations l(Some(x)) = x] and l(None) = ] .
To distinguish between components of the receiver state and the sender state that have the same eld names, we use a`dotted identi er' notation, e.g. S:header and R:header.
It is also possible to generate abs automatically as a set of corresponding state pairs as done in 10]. This would not allow to document abs explicitly, but it would mean a step forward towards fully automatic support | the major advantage of model checking.
check itself realizes the predicate is weak pmap(abs B A) b y simply performing full state space exploration. Beginning with startsB the algorithm examines all reachable states, checking for every transition <s 1 a s 2 > 2 trans of (B) that either <abs (s 1 ) a abs(s 2 )> 2 trans of (A) (if a is external) or abs(s 1 ) = abs(s 2 ) (if a is internal).
At the moment the ML-code for the di erent arguments of check is still generated manually. However, we i n tend to automate this, subject to the restrictions on B described above. It should also be noted that check is just a prototype which should be replaced by some optimized model checker, for example the one described in 9].
